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This paper analyses the impact of activist hedge funds (AHFs) on post-merger workforce
downsizing and operating performance. AHFs have been widely criticized for achieving
short-term gains at the expense of other stakeholders, such as employees. The results
show that AHF ownership and presence in acquiring firms is a significant determinant
of post-merger employment reductions. There is little evidence that these mergers and
acquisitions have better operating performance relative to other takeovers. However, there
is a negative effect of AHF ownership on labour productivity. Overall, the results are
consistent with the view that AHF involvement in takeovers does not lead to sustained
gains in performance.
Introduction
Shareholder activism has become an important
corporate governance mechanism. Specifically, ac-
tivist hedge funds (AHFs) now play a major role
in mergers and acquisitions (M&As) and subse-
quent corporate restructuring (Boyson, Gantchev
and Shivdasani, 2017; Gantchev, Sevilir and Shiv-
dasani, 2020; Greenwood and Schor, 2009). As in
takeovers initiated by other types of investors (see
Amess, Girma and Wright, 2014; Conyon et al.,
2002), restructuring initiated by AHFs can in-
volve employment reductions (Chen,Meyer-Doyle
and Shi, 2021; DesJardine and Durand, 2020),
wage cuts (Brav, Jiang and Kim, 2015) and divesti-
tures (Gantchev, Sevilir and Shivdasani, 2020),
all aimed at securing immediate gains in com-
pany value and operating performance. Some ar-
gue that these initiatives breach long-term implicit
contracts with employees (Agrawal and Lim, 2021)
and facilitate wealth transfer from employees to
shareholders (Coffee and Palia, 2016). However,
whether restructuring after takeovers with AHF
involvement leads to performance improvements is
uncertain, with mixed evidence on post-takeover
performance (Gantchev, Sevilir and Shivdasani,
2020).
AHFs differ from most other investment funds
in their investment time horizons and strategic in-
tentions (Cumming and Wood, 2019; Gospel and
Pendleton, 2014). As AHFs tend to make short-
term investments (on average between 1 and 2
years) (Brav et al., 2008), they are likely to initiate
or seek changes that can be implemented more or
less immediately after the transaction (Brav, Jiang
and Kim, 2015). Often AHFs are the instigators
of takeovers aimed at industry restructuring, as in
the case of Trian and Pentair plc.1 Such restructur-
ing may increase the share price in the short term,
but have little impact (or even adverse effects)
on longer-term performance. This has been the
1In 2015, Trian owned a 7.2% stake in Pentair plc and
urged the company to increase value by facilitating ‘pru-
dent industry consolidation’. In that year, Pentair ac-
quired a privately held component manufacturer for $1.8
billion in cash. In 2017, Pentair sold a valves and con-
trols business it had acquired a few years earlier for $3.2
billion and decided to split its largest businesses, electri-
cal and water products, into two separate companies (The
Deal Pipeline, 2017).
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primary criticism of hedge funds: they extract
short-term value and then exit, leaving others to
‘pick up the pieces’ in the longer term.
Whilst there is now extensive, thoughmixed, evi-
dence on the performance outcomes of AHF inter-
ventions to force governance changes, and there is
some evidence on AHF effects on takeover targets
(Boyson, Gantchev and Shivdasani, 2017), there is
very little evidence on the employment and perfor-
mance effects of AHF involvement in takeover ac-
quirers. Further, there is almost no evidence at all
on the effects of AHF activity in the UK, despite
the UK being the second most important location
of hedge fund activity worldwide after the USA.
This paper adds to the evidence base by analysing
the relationships between AHF ownership, post-
takeover workforce downsizing and long-term op-
erating performance. To this end, we address two
main questions. Are there greater employment re-
ductions where AHFs are blockholders in the ac-
quiring firm? Do takeovers with AHF involve-
ment have superior post-merger profitability and
productivity?
To answer these questions, we analyse the im-
pact of AHF ownership on the probability and
magnitude of post-merger workforce downsizing
as well as on post-merger operating performance
over a 3-year period. Our analysis is based on 421
M&A transactions involving UK publicly listed
companies during 1990–2017. Of these, 26 (28)
acquirers have at least one AHF blockholder at
the beginning (end) of the financial year in which
the M&A deal is completed. Although AHFs are
involved in relatively few takeovers, our results
show significant relationships between AHFs and
post-merger employment changes. AHF owner-
ship in the acquirer is positively associated with
the likelihood of employment reductions, along
with the magnitude of employee change. The prof-
itability of acquirers with AHF ownership does
not differ from that of other acquirers. However,
there is strong and consistent evidence that acquir-
ing firms with AHF ownership experience lower
labour productivity post-takeover. Furthermore,
takeovers with AHF presence experience changes
in profitability and productivity that are signifi-
cantly worse than in other takeovers.
The main contribution of this paper is that
it shows that AHF ownership has a set of ad-
verse impacts on post-takeover employment, prof-
itability and productivity, and these findings con-
trast with those from the USA that emphasize the
positive effects of AHF activity (e.g. Brav, Jiang
and Kim, 2015; Gantchev, Sevilir and Shivdasani,
2020). Our findings support those viewswhich sug-
gest that initial gains are dissipated longer term
(Coffee and Palia, 2016). We find all pain, little
gain. An important contribution of the research
is that it shows that AHFs do not have to mount
public campaigns to make an impact, if the cor-
porate governance system is more ‘shareholder-
friendly’ than that found in the USA. To date,
there have been few public campaigns by AHFs in
the UK. Our focus has been guided by the nature
of the UK corporate governance system, which
generally favours ‘behind-the-scenes’ relationships
with managers rather than overt conflict and pub-
lic campaigns. Our results bear out the validity of
our approach. An important implication of our re-
sults, therefore, is that the nature of corporate gov-
ernance regimes should be factored in when evalu-
ating the impact of particular actors on company
behaviour and performance (Buchanan, Chai and
Deakin, 2020). Institutional context affects how
actors achieve their objectives.
Although there is an extensive literature in
management, economics and finance on the ef-
fect of takeovers on employees (Amess, Girma
and Wright, 2014; Dessaint, Golubov and
Volpin, 2017; Geurts and Biesebroeck, 2017)
and companies (King et al., 2004; Renneboog
and Vansteenkiste, 2019), there is very little on
AHF involvement in takeovers, and its effects,
even in the USA (as opposed to other governance
interventions). Those studies focusing on AHF
involvement have tended to examine the effects
on targets rather than acquirers (e.g. Boyson,
Gantchev and Shivdasani, 2017). AHFs might be
expected to have substantial effects on takeover
outcomes because of their concern to influence
management decision-making. We find this, but
the effects are either negative or weak, unlike
recent US studies (e.g. Gantchev, Sevilir and Shiv-
dasani, 2020). The adverse effect on productivity
is especially notable and, taken in conjunction
with results showing employment reductions, is
consistent with those perspectives on takeovers
that emphasize the damaging effects of loss of hu-
man capital (Chen, Meyer-Doyle and Shi, 2021).
The implication of our findings for managers is
that they should seek to avoid AHF attention, es-
pecially if planning M&As. If AHFs are present,
managers need to be judicious in responding to
any AHF pressure for restructuring post-takeover.
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The paper proceeds by reviewing the literature
and developing the hypotheses. The data and key
variables are then discussed, results are presented
and conclusions are drawn.
Literature review
AHF ownership, mergers and restructuring
There is growing interest in the effects of activist
investors on investee companies (Cumming and
Wood, 2019; Gillan and Starks, 2000; Goergen
et al., 2018; Gospel, Pendleton and Vitols, 2014;
Wright et al., 2007). Activism can be defined as
‘taking an equity stake in a company with the in-
tention to influence the control or themanagement
of the company’ (DesJardine andDurand, 2020, p.
1055). Shareholder activism has become a broadly
used investment strategy associated with the in-
creasing willingness of investors to trigger corpo-
rate change and intervene in management’s deci-
sions (Bratton and McCahery, 2015; Filatotchev
andDotsenko, 2015). An important issue in the lit-
erature on activism is the nature and extent of the
impact on company operations and performance
(Briggs, 2007; Coffee and Palia, 2016).
Activist investors come in various forms, includ-
ing some pension funds (e.g. CalPERS) (Jacoby,
2007), ‘social activists’ such as unions and reli-
gious organizations (Ahn and Wiersema, 2021)
and some sovereign wealth funds (such as the
Norwegian Government Pension Fund-Global)
(Goergen et al., 2018). Hedge fund activism is
distinctive as it focuses on securing changes in
management strategy or organization to achieve
short-term abnormal stock returns (Kahan and
Rock, 2007). AHFs have primarily financial
motives and tend to target underperforming com-
panies (Boyson, Gantchev and Shivdasani, 2017)
to improve performance via governance, finan-
cial and strategic changes. Hedge fund activism
therefore differs from relational investing aimed
at achieving longer-term improvements in per-
formance, and from activism aimed at improving
social or environmental performance. Indeed,
much of the criticism of AHFs is that short-term
stock price gains are achieved at the expense of
longer-term performance, including R&D invest-
ment (Coffee and Palia, 2016), social and environ-
mental concerns (DesJardine, Marti and Durand,
2021) and the interests of other stakeholders, such
as employees (Agrawal and Lim, 2021).
Hedge funds typically pursue more aggressive
investment strategies than other institutional in-
vestors such as mutual funds or pension funds,
and thus can have a greater impact on company
decision-making. Originally, the term was used to
define funds that hedged their investments, but it
now covers a wider range of investment strategies
(Gospel and Pendleton, 2014, p. 9). The distinctive
features of hedge funds are that they are relatively
undiversified, lightly regulated and open only to
wealthy and sophisticated investors, presumably
with relatively low risk aversion. Most are regis-
tered offshore. The structure of management fees
and returns to the general partners of the fund is
such that they are incentivized to pursue risky and
short-termist strategies (Coffee and Palia, 2016).
Hedge funds have a variety of investment
strategies, the most common being ‘directional’
(whereby funds exploit and even cause market
movements). Activism is less common and can
vary from being the primary investment focus
through to occasional activism (Buchanan, Chai
and Deakin, 2020). Currently, 897 hedge funds
worldwide are recorded as activist shareholders in
the Activist Insight database. Among these, 112
hedge funds are classified as ‘primary focus’ ac-
tivists and 206 as ‘partial focus’ activists.2 Our
attention centres on such funds. In 2018 (2019),
55 (55) UK firms were targeted by such activist
investors, a steady increase from 2014. Of these,
between 15% and 33% have been M&A related
(Booth, 2020).
Although AHFs are becoming increasingly im-
portant sources of activist pressure on company
managements in the UK (Becht et al., 2009; Becht
et al., 2017), most research on hedge fund ac-
tivism has been conducted in the USA (where such
activity is most widespread; Gospel and Pendle-
ton, 2014; Wiersema, Ahn and Zhang, 2020).
This research focuses on observable interventions,
such as proxy fights, to put pressure on manage-
ment (Aguilera, Federo and Ponomareva, 2019).
The objectives of activism include changes to
2In the Activist Insight database, ‘primary focus’ activists
are defined as investors who proactively and systemati-
cally identify and target underperforming companies, at-
tempting to enhance shareholder value through the exe-
cution of shareholder activism. Similarly, ‘partial focus’
activists also proactively and systematically target under-
performing companies. However, they differ from ‘pri-
mary focus’ activists in that activist investments will tend
to comprise only a portion of their investment portfolios.
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governance, financial structure or assets, and the
sale of the company. Acquisition of seats on the
board of directors is the most common cam-
paign objective (Ahn andWiersema, 2021, p. 105).
AHF campaigns tend to be highly public, with
AHFs competing for shareholder votes against in-
cumbent managements. The public nature of ac-
tivism in the USA (which has tended to define
how hedge fund activism is viewed) may well owe
much to the nature of the US corporate gover-
nance system, whereby managers have had a series
of legal and other protections against shareholder
‘sovereignty’, such as ‘poison pills’ and staggered
boards. Opposition to management has almost in-
evitably taken place in the public arena. Investor
activism has been enhanced by recent legal re-
forms, giving AHFs more freedom to mount cam-
paigns (Ahn and Wiersema, 2021).
As institutional theory predicts, investor be-
haviour is likely shaped by institutional and sys-
temic contexts (DiMaggio and Powell, 1991; Scott,
2007). The differences between the corporate gov-
ernance systems of the UK and the USA mean
that AHF activism may take different forms. The
more ‘shareholder-friendly’ regime in the UK, and
the long-standing preference for governance re-
lationships to take place privately and discretely
(Black and Coffee, 1994; Holland, 1998; Gospel
and Pendleton, 2005), suggests that AHF activ-
ity is more discrete, and less confrontational. It
often comprises ‘behind-the-scenes’ relationships
with managers (Levit, 2019; McCahery, Sautner
and Starks, 2016).
Whilst highly public and oppositional US-style
activism does occur in the UK, often instigated
by US-based hedge funds, it tends to be rare.
The most successful cases of US funds prompting
change in UK companies have used collaborative
activism (with managers) rather than ‘an aggres-
sive, table-thumping, American-style campaign’
(Booth, 2020, p. 10). The important methodologi-
cal consequence is that evaluation of the full effects
of AHF activity in the UK cannot be solely linked
to observable activist intervention campaigns or
events. As the mere presence of AHF ownership
can put pressure on management, studies of the
effects of AHFs should focus on presence as well
as specific interventions (DesJardine and Durand,
2020).
The focus of our research is AHF involvement
inM&As. This is novel, as previous work onAHFs
hasmainly focused on interventions to force gover-
nance, board composition or strategy change. The
rationale for our approach is the steep increase
in M&A activity by hedge funds in recent years
(Reetun, 2020).3 We examine an area of AHF ac-
tivity that has not been widely examined previ-
ously. We do this by studying acquiring firms with
AHF blockholders in the immediate run-up and
aftermath of takeovers.
AHF interventions in takeovers can take a vari-
ety of forms. In the USA, Greenwood and Schor
(2009) and Boyson, Gantchev and Shivdasani
(2017) report that AHFs target firms with more
opportunities for restructuring (such as highly
unionized companies; see Brav, Jiang and Kim,
2015) and urge third parties to acquire the tar-
geted firm.4 Alternatively, AHFs may campaign
against thoseM&A deals offering lower premiums
to the acquired firm’s shareholders.5 Gantchev,
Sevilir and Shivdasani (2020) argue that AHFs dis-
cipline ‘empire-building’managers by constraining
them tomake fewer acquisitions, preventing acqui-
sitions aimed at diversification.
Equally, there are cases in our dataset where
AHFs pressured managers to mount several
takeovers with a view to both diversification
and disposal of surplus activities. In ‘behind-the-
scenes’ negotiations with management, AHFs of-
ten push for divestments, along with employment
reductions and lay-offs (Chen, Meyer-Doyle and
Shi, 2021). A good example in our dataset is the
takeover of formerMonopoly-maker Waddington
by the John Mansfield Group in 1999. Mans-
field’s management were encouraged by an AHF
investor to acquire struggling companies, such as
Waddington, with a view to developing parts of
them and disposing of the remainder (The Inde-
pendent, 1999).
According to ‘wealth transfer’ theory (Bacon,
Hoque and Wright, 2019; Shleifer and Summers,
1988; Wright et al., 2007), activists initiate or en-
courage M&A deals and subsequent restructuring
3In 2018 (2019), activist investors made M&A-related in-
terventions in 182 (167) companies globally, which was
19% (20%) of all companies publicly subjected to activist
demands (Reetun, 2020).
4For example, in 2018, Elliott Management supported
Melrose in its bid for GKN (The Times, 2018).
5An example of this is that in 2017, Elliott Management
actively opposed the takeover bid made for Sky plc, in or-
der to increase the premium offered by the bidder. Conse-
quently, in 2019, Sky plc was sold at a high premium (The
Wall Street Journal, 2018).
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to achieve short-term abnormal stock returns at
the expense of other stakeholders such as employ-
ees. This is because such interventions are typically
aimed at companies believed to be underperform-
ing, where there is scope for quick and substantial
improvements. The expectation is that the stock
market will respond positively to such initiatives
to enhance labour productivity and operating
performance. These takeovers can therefore lead
to substantial workforce downsizing and wage
cuts (Amess, Girma and Wright, 2014; Goergen,
Brewster and Wood, 2013). Some studies show
that reductions in labour costs are the main source
of M&A gains (Dessaint, Golubov and Volpin,
2017), and that most of the M&A premium is
recovered by such reductions (Krishnan, Hitt and
Park, 2007).
US evidence shows a decline in employment
after AHF interventions (Brav, Jiang and Kim,
2015). Allaire and Dauphin (2016) report a re-
duction of around 15% in the workforce of firms
targeted by AHFs relative to workforce changes
in other firms. DesJardine and Durand (2020)
find that AHF interventions are associated with
a 4.6% decline in workforce size in the year af-
ter the intervention, and 7.7% within the 5-year
period.6 Chen, Meyer-Doyle and Shi (2021) con-
clude that activist-induced workforce downsizing
leads to an undesirable loss of human capital as
valuable employees leave firms targeted by AHFs,
with potentially negative effects on company
performance.
However, there is limited empirical evidence
on the impact of AHFs on employment in the
UK. Extant evidence tends to be case study based
(Gospel et al., 2011), as in discussions of the
effect of hedge fund interventions on employ-
ment in Cadbury’s plants after the Kraft takeover7
(Pendleton and Gospel, 2014). A good illustra-
tion of the processes at work is provided by the
former CEO of one of the companies in our
dataset:
I was approached by an activist combining investing
with consulting… They then approached our lead-
6ThyssenKrupp came under strong pressure from AHFs
to reduce their assets and workforce (Financial Times,
2018).
7In the final stage of this well-known takeover, hedge
funds owned 31% of Cadbury and gained large returns
for their short-term investment (Business, Innovation and
Skills Committee, 2010).
ing shareholders… and proposed using United In-
dustries as an acquisition vehicle to vacuum up small
UK-quoted engineering companies and then they
would cut their costs…
After he resigned in protest at the adoption of
this strategy:
… a successor was appointed with the simple brief to
acquire almost anything and then use these consul-
tants to cut its costs… The consultants duly went to
work… the result of this acquisition and cost-cutting
strategy? Just two years after I left United Industries
as a profitable cash generative group…, it collapsed
and was broken up. (Brown, 2017, pp. 84–85)
Whilst these accounts suggest that AHFs af-
fect company decision-making, more systematic
and generalizable evidence is needed to deter-
mine whether AHFs have adverse impacts on
labour after M&As, given that public debate often
highlights this outcome (Ahn and Wiersema,
2021; Filatotchev and Wright, 2017). Based on
the discussion above, the supposition is that the
short-term focus of AHFs is especially associated
with cost savings post-takeover, and that labour
bears the brunt of these. Based on this discussion,
we arrive at the following hypothesis:
H1: Acquiring firms with AHF ownership will
have larger employment reductions post-merger.
AHF ownership and post-merger profitability
Although AHF interventions are motivated by a
concern to improve company performance, evi-
dence ismixed. Some find evidence of performance
improvement in the short term (e.g. Brav et al.,
2008), others report little change (e.g. deHaan,
Larcker and McClure, 2019), whilst others find
significant decline in the longer-term performance
(e.g. DesJardine and Durand, 2020). Nevertheless,
most studies show improvements in operating per-
formance after AHF interventions (Denes, Kar-
poff andMcWilliams, 2016), possibly as a result of
divestment of underperforming assets (Chen and
Feldman, 2018; Clifford, 2008).
Much of the extant evidence relates to per-
formance improvement close to the intervention.
Brav et al. (2008) and Clifford (2008) report
ROA improvement for the 2-year period after the
AHF intervention, whilst other researchers’ simi-
lar findings relate to the year following the event
(e.g. González and Calluzzo, 2019; Boyson and
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Mooradian, 2011). Longer term, Bebchuk, Brav
and Jiang (2015) and Bebchuk et al. (2020) find
only weak evidence of profitability improvements
in the 5 years after activist interventions. Con-
versely, Greenwood and Schor (2009) and deHaan,
Larcker andMcClure (2019) find no improvement
in operating performance measures after AHF in-
terventions. Boyson and Pichler (2019) report that
the intervention strategies of AHFs are not associ-
ated withROA, but are associated with higher cash
flow returns. DesJardine and Durand (2020) find
that firms targeted by AHFs improve their market
value and profitability in the short term (2 years),
but they incur substantial losses in their operat-
ing cash flow performance during the subsequent
5-year period.
However, these results relate to US settings:
alternative settings may mean that AHF strate-
gies are less successful in enhancing performance.
This supposition is borne out by Buchanan, Chai
and Deakin’s (2020) study of AHFs in Japan,
which finds mostly insignificant changes in short-
termperformance, but significant negative changes
in longer-term performance, including both firm
profitability and market capitalization.
Concerning AHF involvement in M&As, there
is limited and mixed empirical evidence on oper-
ating performance changes post-acquisition. Wu
and Chung (2021) find that acquirers with AHFs
improve their performance post-takeover. Hege
and Zhang (2020) conclude that, when acquir-
ers are targeted by AHFs, large acquirers do not
secure improvements in operating performance,
but small ones do. In contrast, Boyson, Gantchev
and Shivdasani (2017) show that firms targeted
by AHFs in M&A deals, but not acquired, sig-
nificantly improve their performance in compari-
son to non-targeted firms. Further research reveals
that AHFs accelerate forced CEO turnover after
poor M&As and only allow managers to make
selective acquisitions that generate high share-
holder returns (Gantchev, Sevilir and Shivdasani,
2020).
Overall, AHFs may focus on improving the
short-term profitability of the targeted firms by ac-
tively participating in their governance. The above
discussion leads us to the following hypothesis:
H2: Acquiring firms with AHF ownership will
have improvements in their profitability during
the 3-year post-takeover period.
AHF ownership and post-merger labour
productivity
Post-merger restructuring initiated by AHFs may
improve labour productivity by shedding less effi-
cient operations and labour. Brav, Jiang and Kim
(2015) show that US plants, targeted by AHFs, im-
prove their labour productivity by reducing their
workforce and work hours. Analysing the spill-
over effects of AHF interventions among the com-
peting firms, Aslan and Kumar (2016) conclude
that both firms targeted by AHFs and their rival
firms improve their productivity. Also, Brav et al.
(2018) report that improvement in the innovation
activities of the firms targeted by AHFs improves
productivity.
However, Chen, Meyer-Doyle and Shi (2021)
find that firms targeted by AHFs achieve lower
performance improvements when these firms expe-
rience higher departure of valuable employees (i.e.
employees with stock options). Targets of AHFs
may also substantially reduce their strategic invest-
ments, operating expenses (including wages) and
R&Dexpenditure (DesJardine andDurand, 2020).
Similarly, Japanese companies targeted by AHFs
do not experience significant changes in labour
productivity (Buchanan, Chai and Deakin, 2020).
A key issue is whether AHFs put longer-term
performance of the targeted firms at risk by focus-
ing on short-term returns, possibly by transferring
wealth from other stakeholders (Agrawal and Lim,
2021; Coffee and Palia, 2016). The argument here
is that short-term abnormal returns are generated
by measures which destroy valuable human capi-
tal in the company, thereby damaging productiv-
ity and profitability in the longer term. Support-
ing this ‘wealth transfer’ argument, Brav, Jiang and
Kim (2015) report a reduction in the productivity-
adjusted wages of employees, despite productivity
improvements after AHF interventions. Expect-
ing such interventions, valuable employees may ac-
celerate their departure from the targeted firms
(Chen, Meyer-Doyle and Shi, 2021) and conse-
quently these firms may incur ‘unexpected’ corpo-
rate outcomes in the longer term (Buchanan, Chai
and Deakin, 2020).
Previous studies find that post-merger restruc-
turing involves large-scale workforce reductions
(Amess, Girma and Wright, 2014; Conyon et al.,
2002) and lay-offs (Kuvandikov, Pendleton and
Higgins, 2014, 2020), which may impact on
labour productivity. Some studies conclude that
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M&As enhance labour productivity, although
such transactions result in post-merger workforce
downsizing (McGuckin and Nguyen, 2001; Siegel
and Simons, 2010). During the post-takeover inte-
gration process, AHFs may also initiate additional
labour cost savings-oriented restructuring, which
may substantially impact on the performance and
productivity of the merging firms. As there are
limited and contradictory views on the association
between AHF ownership and post-merger labour
productivity, we test the following hypothesis:
H3: Acquiring firms with AHF ownership expe-
rience improvements in their labour productivity
during the 3-year post-takeover period.
Data and methodology
Approach and sample
We analyse the impact of ownership by AHFs on
employment changes and operating performance
using data on 421 M&As occurring between UK
listed firms during 1990–2017. During this period,
AHF activity has developed from small beginnings
in the early 1990s to more extensive activity in the
2000s, especially since 2014. The sampling period
ends in 2017, since we require 3 years of post-
takeover performance data.
The overall approach is to examine the effects of
both the presence and level of ownership of AHFs
in the acquirer in the lead-up to the takeover and
shortly afterwards on variousmeasures of employ-
ment change and operating performance. The ra-
tionale for this approach is that AHFs will influ-
ence the objectives (e.g. efficiency improvements)
and character of the takeover, along with the mea-
sures taken in the immediate aftermath to secure
the fruits of the transaction. A key assumption is
that AHFs take an ownership position in a com-
pany specifically to secure changes to governance,
management or strategy (Briggs, 2007).
During the period there were 1,147 full
takeovers (where acquirers secured more than
50% of the target’s equity) of UK listed compa-
nies by other companies listed on the London
Stock Exchange. Takeovers involving property,
financial and utility companies are excluded
because these firms have either different assets
characteristics, reporting requirements or regula-
tory regimes. This leaves us with 746 transactions.
Of these, we retained 421 (56% of the total), after
removing 325 cases where acquirers conducted
multiple acquisitions within 3 years of the ob-
served takeover (making it difficult to isolate the
effects of particular takeovers). Our final sample
is similar to other studies of UK takeovers (e.g.
Mira, Goergen and O’Sullivan, 2018).
Transaction-related data, includingM&A dates,
premium, takeover mode and payment type were
collected from Thomson Reuters. These data were
merged with financial and employment data from
Datastream. Ownership by large shareholders
was hand-collected from company annual reports,
downloaded from the Filings Expert database. The
identity of AHFs was checked against the Activist
Insight database.
As outlined earlier, AHFs’ influence in the
British corporate governance system can be se-
cured privately rather than via US-style public
campaigns. We therefore analyse the relationships
between AHF presence (measured by ownership
and simple presence) and post-merger workforce
changes. Next, we analyse the impact of AHF
presence on post-takeover operating performance.
We run a series of regressions based on the
following:
Post-merger downsizing = a
+ b1AHFownership (orAHFpresence)
+ b2Controls + e




Post-merger Employment change%, Employment
decline%, Employment growth% and Employ-
ment reduction variables are used to measure
post-merger workforce downsizing. Employment
change% by the end of the first financial year af-
ter the takeover is calculated by subtracting the
combined pre-takeover employment of the ac-
quirer and target from the employment of the
post-merger firm at the end of the first full post-
takeover year, and then dividing the difference
by the average of post- and pre-takeover employ-
ment (Davis et al., 2014). To analyse the effects
of AHFs on employment, we create two truncated
© 2021 The Authors. British Journal of Management published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of British
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variables to be used in tobit regressions: Employ-
ment decline% uses the absolute values of employ-
ment reductions, with zeros for cases with em-
ployment growth; whereas Employment growth%
records the percentage growth where growth has
occurred, with zeros where there is employment
decline. Employment reduction – an alternative bi-
nomial measure – is derived from the above infor-
mation on employment change and is equal to one
if there is employment decline by the end of the
first full financial year after takeover, and zero oth-
erwise.
Performance is measured by ROA, ROS and
Productivity variables in each of the three post-
takeover years. ROA is defined as earnings be-
fore interest, taxes, depreciation and amortiza-
tion divided by the book value of total assets
at the beginning of the year. ROS is arguably a
more suitable measure for M&As, because there
may be large changes in asset valuation post-
takeover (Krishnan, Hitt and Park, 2007).We con-
trol for industry-level profitability changes by us-
ing industry-adjusted measures for each firm in
the regressions. Productivity is sales divided by
the annual average number of employees (Amess,
Girma and Wright, 2014; Datta et al., 2010; Go-
ergen, O’Sullivan and Wood, 2014). As the Pro-
ductivity variable is not normally distributed, we
log-transform this variable (Brav, Jiang and Kim,
2015).
Independent variables
Our main independent variables are the equity
ownership of the AHFs in the acquirers (i.e. per-
centage ownership) and a dummy variable, which
indicates whether an AHF is present. We collect
data on AHFs from the pre-takeover year and
takeover completion year annual reports of the
acquiring firms.8 We use four measures of AHF
ownership and presence: AHF, AHF presence,
post-merger AHF and post-merger AHFpresence.
Ownership is an often-used measure of investor
power in corporate governance research (Goergen,
2018). AsAHFs often take small stakes as a ‘trojan
horse’ for intervention in themanagement of firms,
their mere presence may impact on employee and
company outcomes.
8In other words, AHFpresence is recorded at the start and
end of the financial year during which the M&A deal is
completed.
The hedge funds in the sample are com-
pared against the activists in the Activist Insight
database. This database distinguishes between four
groups of activist shareholders according to their
focus on activism: ‘primary focus’, ‘partial fo-
cus’, ‘occasional focus’ or ‘engagement focus’. If a
hedge fund has a ‘primary focus’ or ‘partial focus’
on activist strategies, and media sources confirm
this, we classify this hedge fund as an AHF. Ac-
tivists with an ‘occasional’ or ‘engagement’ focus
are not classified as AHFs in our analysis, because
we cannot be sure that they actively intervened in
the observed takeovers. They are classed as insti-
tutional investors instead. Finally, any activist in-
vestors other than hedge funds are classified as in-
stitutional investors.
As shown in Table 1, a total of 24 AHFs
have large equity stakes (exceeding 3% of equity)
in 26 (28) acquirers at the beginning (end) of
the takeover year. Seventeen acquiring firms have
AHF ownership throughout the takeover period.
AHFs are present at some stage in 37 (8.8%) of our
sample cases. Further, 7.6% of all worldwide op-
erating AHFs (as classified in the Activist Insight
database) are present in our sample.9 On average,
these AHFs own 9.4% (11.9%) of the acquiring
firm shares at the beginning (end) of the takeover
year.
The pattern of AHF activity in our sample is
similar to that described in the literature (e.g. Shi
et al., 2020).10 Except for three cases, AHFs have
exited by the end of the first full financial year after
the takeover. Eighty-one percent of takeovers with
AHFs have taken place since 2000, with a small
majority of these in the period before the financial
crisis of 2007–9.
Controls
It is important to control for performance in both
target and acquirer prior to the takeover, as there
could be path-dependency effects on post-takeover
outcomes (Goergen and Renneboog, 2004). Con-
trols are included for profitability (ROA), Lever-
age (the ratio of total debt to total assets), Cash
holdings (the ratio of cash and cash equivalents
9The Activist Insight database indicates that there are 318
international AHFs with a ‘primary focus’ or ‘partial fo-
cus’ on activism.
10Shi et al. (2020) report that activist investors target 7%
of S&P 1500 companies included in their sample.
© 2021 The Authors. British Journal of Management published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of British
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics
Variable type Mean Median SD
Panel A: Acquirers with AHF ownership sub-sample
AHF % 9.37 8.19 5.10
Post-merger AHF % 11.85 10.15 12.43
Panel B: Full sample
AHF % 0.52 0.00 2.36
AHF presence (0, 1) 0.06 0.00 0.23
Post-merger AHF % 0.74 0.00 4.23
Post-merger AHF presence (0, 1) 0.06 0.00 0.24
Institutions % 27.50 26.01 19.11
Institutions (post-merger) % 26.52 25.32 17.03
Individuals % 5.80 0.00 15.63
Individuals (post-merger) % 4.80 0.00 13.00
Employment change% % −2.06 −2.08 38.15
Employment decline% % −14.19 −2.08 25.27
Employment growth% % 12.13 0.00 21.72
Employment reduction (0, 1) 0.53 1.00 0.50
Divestments (0, 1) 0.24 0.00 0.43
Acquirer size (market value) £ million 1,664 196 6,437
Acquirer ROA % 14.99 15.00 16.48
Acquirer ROS % 9.75 12.00 34.49
Acquirer productivity Continuous 162.41 95.74 197.36
Acquirer leverage % 18.40 16.00 15.95
Acquirer cash holdings % 14.22 9.00 16.30
Target size (market value) £ million 239 36 639
Target ROA % 9.59 12.00 17.21
Target ROS % −36.66 8.00 237.53
Target productivity Continuous 141.61 87.98 148.56
Target leverage % 19.20 15.93 18.56
Target cash holdings % 12.44 6.00 17.35
Relative employment Continuous 0.89 0.37 1.66
Premium % 35.38 33.00 36.96
Hostile (0, 1) 0.18 0.00 0.38
Cash (0, 1) 0.31 0.00 0.46
Related (0, 1) 0.62 1.00 0.49
Notes: This table reports the mean, median and standard deviation of all variables used in the analyses. The sample includes 421M&A
deals involving UK listed companies during 1990–2017. M&A data are collected from Thomson Reuters database, firm-level data are
collected from the Datastream, Filings Expert and Activist Insight databases. Panel A displays data only on AHF ownership in the
sub-sample of acquirers with AHFs, whereas Panel B displays data on all variables for the full sample. All variables are defined in
Table 1A.
to total assets) and Acquirer (Target) size, mea-
sured by market value. Since the post-merger com-
pany may change its employment by divesting
business units, a dummy (Divestments) records
whether divestments occurred by the end of the
first post-takeover financial year. One-hundred-
and-one acquirers (24%) make such divestments
(similar to Maksimovic, Phillips and Prabhala,
2011).
As other large shareholders may influence man-
agement decisions, we control for blockhold-
ings (3% or more) by investment institutions
(Institutions (post-merger)) and individuals (In-
dividuals (post-merger)) in the acquiring firm at
the beginning (end) of the takeover completion
year.
We also control for transaction characteristics
as they can affect employment and performance
post-takeover (Lehto and Böckerman, 2008; Mar-
tynova andRenneboog, 2011).Hostile takeover in-
dicates whether the initial bid was rejected by the
target (Franks and Mayer, 1996; Weir and Wright,
2006). Cash records whether the transaction was
paid wholly in cash. Related acquisitions are those
© 2021 The Authors. British Journal of Management published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of British
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Panel A: Post-merger employment change
Employment change
(%)
−0.57 −25.87 25.30*** −0.57 −24.12 23.55***
Employment decline
sub-sample (%)
−13.10 −30.76 17.66*** −13.05 −30.26 17.21***
Employment growth
sub-sample (%)




50.89 84.62 −33.73*** 48.35 71.43 −23.08***
Panel B: Post-merger profitability (industry-adjusted performance measures)
Pre-merger ROA 0.04 0.06 −0.02
Year 1 ROA 0.01 0.04 −0.03
Year 2 ROA 0.00 0.05 −0.05
Year 3 ROA −0.01 0.04 −0.04
Pre-merger ROS −0.01 0.12 −0.13
Year 1 ROS 0.03 0.18 −0.15
Year 2 ROS −0.02 0.03 −0.05
Year 3 ROS 0.00 0.04 −0.04




Year 1 Productivity 2.06 2.05 0.01
Year 2 Productivity 2.08 2.13 −0.05
Year 3 Productivity 2.08 2.18 −0.10
Notes: This table presents the results of the univariate analyses on post-merger employment changes (Panel A) and post-merger oper-
ating performance (Panel B). Differences between mean scores are tested using t-tests and chi-square tests.
Significance levels: *** p < 0.001.
where both the target and acquirer are in the same
sector (as per Datastream Industrial Classification
Level Four). Since high takeover premiums can
lead to employment reductions (Krishnan, Hitt
and Park, 2007), we include Premium (i.e. the per-
centage difference between the purchase price and
the market price of the acquired firm’s shares 30
days before the first announcement of the takeover,
divided by the latter; Hayward and Hambrick,
1997). Relative employment – the ratio of employ-
ment in the target to that in the acquirer prior to
the takeover – is included as it may affect the ca-
pacity of the acquirer to digest the target.
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics of all the
variables: Table 1A in the online Supporting Infor-
mation provides their definitions, while Table 2A
shows the correlations among these variables.
Results
Univariate analysis
Table 2 contains a univariate analysis of work-
force downsizing (measured with employment
changes in percentage and the employment reduc-
tion dummy variable) and operating performance
(measured by ROA, ROS and Productivity across
the 3 years post-takeover). In Panel A, one set
of figures compares acquirers with AHF investors
pre-takeover with other firms, whilst the other set
compares post-merger firms with AHF investors
with the rest. Employment change is significantly
more negative amongst those acquirers withAHFs
before as well as after the takeover. The difference
in Employment change% between these two sub-
samples is 25.30 percentage points and significant
© 2021 The Authors. British Journal of Management published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of British
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Table 3. Determinants of post-takeover workforce downsizing: probit regressions (marginal effects)
Employment reduction




Post-merger AHF presence 0.286**
Institutions 0.000 0.000
Individuals 0.000 0.001
Institutions (post-merger) 0.000 −0.001
Individuals (post-merger) 0.001 0.001
Acquirer size 0.014 0.016 0.014 0.014
Acquirer ROA −0.433** −0.425** −0.479*** −0.490***
Acquirer leverage 0.157 0.171 0.158 0.158
Acquirer cash holdings 0.152 0.139 0.146 0.161
Target size 0.029 0.026 0.032 0.031
Target ROA 0.015 0.011 0.011 0.01
Target leverage −0.086 −0.099 −0.088 −0.09
Target cash holdings −0.17 −0.189 −0.181 −0.201
Relative employment 0.047* 0.049** 0.048* 0.049**
Premium −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001*
Hostile 0.074 0.069 0.073 0.074
Cash 0.088 0.089 0.082 0.088
Related 0.036 0.035 0.036 0.043
Constant
Chi square 95.171*** 97.903*** 90.367*** 92.484***
Adjusted R square 0.163 0.168 0.155 0.159
Number of observations 421 421 421 421
Notes: This table reports probit regressions estimating the probability of post-merger workforce downsizing. Employment reduction
indicates whether there is an employment decline by the end of the first full financial year after the takeover.
All regressions include year dummies.
Significance levels: * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001.
at the 0.1% level. However, Panels B and C show
that the differences in operating performance mea-
sures between firms with AHFs and those with-
out are insignificant. These initial results suggest
that the presence of AHFs just before and after
takeovers impacts employment changes but not
performance.
AHFs and post-merger restructuring
Table 3 presents the results of probit regressions
predicting the probability of workforce downsiz-
ing (i.e. Employment reduction as the dependent bi-
nary variable) by AHF ownership or AHF pres-
ence. All columns report the marginal effects of
the independent variables. Columns 1 and 2 indi-
cate that AHF and AHF presence have significant
effects on the probability of post-merger employ-
ment reductions, whilst columns 3 and 4 present
that Post-merger AHF has similar effects on em-
ployment. If an acquirer has an AHF investor,
then the probability of a workforce reduction post-
acquisition increases by 39.8% (significant at the
0.1% level). Themarginal effects for the pre-merger
AHFmeasures are somewhat larger than those for
the comparable post-merger measures, suggesting
that AHF involvement prior to the takeover has a
larger impact. Overall, there is some support for
H1, but with the proviso that AHF presence mat-
ters while the magnitude of ownership does not.
The results also suggest that Institutions and In-
dividual investors do not affect post-merger work-
force downsizing, but the probability of such
downsizing depends on the performance of the ac-
quiring firm and relative size of the merging firms.
All columns show that Relative employment size
is a significant determinant of downsizing, con-
firming that employment reductions are made in
larger targets. Further, Employment reduction de-
pends onAcquirer ROA, but not onTarget ROA, as
© 2021 The Authors. British Journal of Management published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of British
Academy of Management.
12 A. Kuvandikov, A. Pendleton and M. Goergen
shown in all columns. Among the deal character-
istics, Premium is weakly associated with the prob-
ability of downsizing, while other deal character-
istics, as well as the Leverage and Cash holdings of
both firms, are insignificant.
AHFs and the extent of workforce downsizing
Table 4 reports the results of regressions analysing
whether AHF ownership explains the magnitude
of employment changes. Panel A uses AHF (pres-
ence) and Panel B uses Post-merger AHF (pres-
ence) as the main independent variable. Columns
1 and 2 use ordinary least squares (OLS) regres-
sions to explain employment changes (measured
by Employment change%). The remaining columns
use tobit regressions, as the dependent variable in
these columns is censored. Columns 3 and 4 use
Employment decline%, while columns 5 and 6 use
Employment growth% as the dependent variable.
Panel A shows that AHF is significantly associ-
ated with Employment change% and Employment
decline% (columns 1 and 3), but not with Employ-
ment growth% (column 5). Column 3 indicates that
a one standard deviation increase in AHF owner-
ship leads to a 0.77 percentage point higher work-
force downsizing. Similarly, columns 2, 4 and 6 use
AHF presence to analyse whether the size of em-
ployment changes differs between acquirers with
and without AHFs. These results are consistent
with the above, as acquirers with AHFs make sig-
nificantly greater employment reductions. Institu-
tions and Individual owners are not associated with
the size of the employment reductions in any of the
columns.
Panel B repeats the above regressions usingPost-
merger AHF (presence) as the key independent
variable. Columns 1, 3 and 5 show that AHF own-
ership at the end of the takeover completion year
is not associated with the size of post-merger em-
ployment change. However, columns 2 and 4 show
that Post-merger AHF presence is significantly as-
sociated with workforce reductions (at the 1% and
0.1% level, respectively), while column 6 shows
that this variable is negatively associated with em-
ployment growth.
All columns show that Institutions and Individ-
ual owners do not impact on the size of work-
force downsizing. Further, Acquirer size is neg-
atively associated with post-merger employment
growth, while Acquirer ROA has a positive effect.
Relative employment also plays a significant role in
determining the size of post-merger workforce re-
ductions. The other control variables are not sig-
nificant.
To sum up, the results suggest that acquir-
ers with AHFs immediately before and after the
takeover make greater employment reductions.
Overall, there is strong support for H1.
The impact of AHFs on long-term operating
performance
Panel A of Table 5 reports the regressions that
analyse the effect of Post-merger AHF ownership
on firm profitability and labour productivity. Con-
trols for the deal characteristics are not included as
the initial analysis showed that they had insignif-
icant effects, with a negligible impact on model
fit. The pre-takeover performance controls were re-
placed with similar controls for the post-takeover
period. Note that the sample size declines some-
what by year due to delisting of some firms.11
Where ROA or ROS is the dependent variable, the
coefficient on the Post-merger AHF variable is in-
significant (except column 4). However, in columns
3, 6 and 9, Post-merger AHF is negatively and
significantly associated with Productivity. For ex-
ample, in column 3 a one standard deviation in-
crease in post-merger AHF ownership leads to
0.49 percentage point lower Productivity. Overall,
AHFs with higher equity ownership in the acquir-
ing firms do not impact on profitability, but they
negatively impact on productivity.
Panel B of Table 5 reports the regressions that
analyse the role of Post-merger AHF presence, as
opposed to level of ownership, in explaining post-
merger performance. These regressions do not
show a consistent difference in profitability (ROA
orROS) between acquiring firms with andwithout
AHFs. However, the presence of AHFs has a con-
sistently negative relationship with productivity, as
per columns 3, 6 and 9. Overall, Productivity de-
clines during the longer-term post-merger period.
In sum, there is weak evidence that acquirers
with AHFs earn a higher level of profit in the first
two post-takeover years (DesJardine and Durand,
2020), but thereafter AHF ownership or presence
has no effect. Thus,AHFs have at best a short-term
11In year 2 and 3 regressions we also exclude six observa-
tions with large residuals (i.e. residuals larger than three
standard deviations) in order to prevent extreme cases ob-
scuring the main pattern of results.
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Table 4. AHF (post-merger AHF) and the size of workforce downsizing: OLS and tobit regressions
Employment change% Employment decline% (in
absolute values)
Employment growth%
OLS regressions Tobit regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: AHF
AHF −0.146** 0.151** −0.09
AHF presence −0.132* 0.122** −0.104*
Institutions 0.002 0.000 −0.003 0.000 −0.013 −0.012
Individuals 0.037 0.036 0.010 0.010 0.055 0.053
Acquirer size −0.219 −0.219 0.073 0.073 −0.288*** −0.289***
Acquirer ROA 0.269*** 0.266*** −0.107* −0.105* 0.246*** 0.242***
Acquirer leverage −0.088 −0.092 0.105* 0.108* −0.037 −0.039
Acquirer cash holdings −0.066 −0.068 0.084 0.089 −0.032 −0.031
Target size 0.118 0.123 −0.094 −0.098 0.08 0.084
Target ROA −0.05 −0.046 0.03 0.025 −0.037 −0.036
Target leverage −0.007 −0.004 0.003 0.001 −0.013 −0.009
Target cash holdings 0.052 0.055 −0.022 −0.024 0.076 0.078
Relative employment −0.224* −0.227* 0.272*** 0.275*** −0.079 −0.082
Premium 0.055 0.058 −0.032 −0.035 0.042 0.045
Hostile −0.066 −0.063 0.023 0.022 −0.078 −0.074
Cash −0.018 −0.02 0.038 0.041 −0.001 −0.002
Related −0.049 −0.053 0.007 0.011 −0.058 −0.061
Constant * * *** ***
F-statistic 3.277*** 3.104***
Chi square 103.771*** 100.510*** 148.461*** 149.979***
Adjusted R square 0.146 0.144 0.027 0.027 0.04 0.04
Number of observations 421 421 421 421 421 421
Panel B: Post-merger AHF
Post-merger AHF −0.1 0.081 −0.076
Post-merger AHF presence −0.174** 0.165*** −0.109*
Institutions (post-merger) 0.034 0.048 −0.022 −0.036 0.019 0.028
Individuals (post-merger) 0.057 0.057 −0.046 −0.044 0.035 0.035
Acquirer size −0.226 −0.214 0.071 0.061 −0.296*** −0.286***
Acquirer ROA 0.281*** 0.290*** −0.122** −0.130** 0.252*** 0.256***
Acquirer leverage −0.088 −0.085 0.102* 0.100* −0.039 −0.037
Acquirer cash holdings −0.051 −0.066 0.074 0.083 −0.021 −0.034
Target size 0.129 0.117 −0.106 −0.094 0.082 0.074
Target ROA −0.041 −0.049 0.023 0.030 −0.031 −0.036
Target leverage −0.006 −0.002 0.006 0.001 −0.009 −0.007
Target cash holdings 0.048 0.06 −0.01 −0.023 0.081 0.089
Relative employment −0.234* −0.229* 0.281*** 0.276*** −0.084 −0.081
Premium 0.056 0.070 −0.037 −0.049 0.041 0.049
Hostile −0.073 −0.066 0.037 0.030 −0.076 −0.072
Cash −0.02 −0.019 0.042 0.041 0.000 −0.001
Related −0.05 −0.061 0.008 0.018 −0.058 −0.066
Constant * * *** ***
F-statistic 2.942*** 3.246***
Chi square 97.890*** 107.616*** 146.253*** 149.124***
Adjusted R square 0.14 0.157 0.026 0.028 0.039 0.04
Number of observations 421 421 421 421 421 421
Notes: This table analyses the effects of AHF ownership (or AHF presence) on post-merger employment change. In Panel A, the
variables of interest are AHF and AHF presence. In Panel B, the variables of interest are Post-merger AHF and Post-merger AHF
presence.
Year and industry dummies are included. The significance levels of the coefficients are based on heteroscedasticity-robust standard
errors. Standardized beta coefficients are reported.
Significance levels: * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001.
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effect on performance. Conversely, there is a con-
sistently negative effect of post-merger AHF pres-
ence on productivity. On balance, therefore, H2 is
not supported, whereas H3 is upheld.
Robustness analysis
To check the robustness of our findings we con-
duct additional tests. First, AHF and Post-merger
AHF data are merged to create a larger group of
acquirers who have had AHF owners either at or
immediately after the M&A. Thereby, we differen-
tiate all acquirers with AHFs from other acquirers
without AHFs. The employment, profitability and
productivity regressions are re-run with the new
variables. The results (reported in Tables 3A and
4A in the online Supporting Information) show
that acquirers with AHFs are significantly associ-
ated with employment reductions (at the 5% level
or better), in all but one estimation. Second, the re-
gressions reported in Table 5A (in the online Sup-
porting Information) also confirm the above find-
ings (reported in Table 5) by showing that there
is no relation between AHF ownership (presence)
and profitability during the post-takeover period,
but there is a significant negative association in
three of four estimations between AHF ownership
(presence) and productivity in the first 2 years after
the takeover.
Third, we analyse post-takeover changes in ‘raw’
(i.e. not adjusted with industry-median perfor-
mance) profitability and productivity measures.
These Change in ROA (ROS or Productivity) vari-
ables are computed as the percentage change in
ROA (ROS or Productivity) for each post-merger
year, relative to the weighted averageROA (ROS or
Productivity) of the acquiring and acquired firms
in the year prior to takeover. The results of the
univariate analyses (reported in Table 6A in the
online Supporting Information) indicate that ac-
quirers with AHFs experience significantly nega-
tiveChange in ROA andChange in ROS during the
post-takeover years (as in Greenwood and Schor,
2009; Klein and Zur, 2009). Table 6 reports the re-
sults of the regressions which use these new de-
pendent variables. Panel A uses Post-merger AHF,
whilst Panel B uses the interaction between AHF
andPost-merger AHF (see above) as themain inde-
pendent variable. In addition to the controls used
in Table 5, these regressions also include a dummy
variable for Employment reduction along with pre-
takeover weighted average ROA (ROS or Produc-
tivity) of the acquiring and acquired firms in the
year prior to takeover, as post-takeover operating
performance changes also depend on the initial
profitability (productivity) of the merging firms.
Panel A indicates that Post-merger AHF leads
to a negative change in the profitability of the ac-
quiring firms during the two post-takeover years,
measured with ROA (columns 1 and 4) and ROS
(columns 2 and 5). The panel also indicates that
Post-merger AHF leads to a negative Change in
Productivity during the three post-takeover years
(columns 3, 6 and 9). Panel B shows that the in-
teraction between AHF and Post-merger AHF is
negatively associatedwith the post-merger changes
in profitability and productivity of the acquiring
firms, but these associations become insignificant
in the third year.
As we use AHF ownership for the beginning
and end of the takeover completion year, and
the employment variables from the first full fi-
nancial year and operating performance variables
from the three financial years after the takeover
completion year, it is less likely that endogene-
ity bias impacts on our main results. Neverthe-
less, we address endogeneity concerns via Durbin–
Wu–Hausman tests (Wooldridge, 2020). First, we
regress AHF (Post-merger AHF) on all control
variables and five instrumental variables, such as
acquirer labour costs, target labour costs, acquirer
cash flow, target cash flow and acquirer capital ex-
penditure. Then, we test the endogeneity of AHF
(Post-merger AHF) by using a residual from the
first regression as an additional regressor in our
main regression model. Our results do not change
qualitatively (see Table 7A in the online Support-
ing Information).
Discussion and conclusions
Our results show thatM&A deals where AHFs are
present involve employment reductions. We find
that AHF ownership in the acquirers determines
the probability and size of these post-merger work-
force reductions. In contrast, individual ownership
and ownership by other institutional investors is
not associated with employment reductions. Over-
all, these results suggest that AHFs focus on reduc-
ing labour costs after M&A deals and put pressure
on managers to bring these about.
We also find that post-merger workforce down-
sizing is associated with lower labour productiv-
© 2021 The Authors. British Journal of Management published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of British
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ity than in other merged firms. There is no clear
effect of AHF presence on levels of profitability.
When changes in performance are examined, there
is clear evidence that firms with AHF involve-
ment have worse changes in profitability and, to a
lesser extent, productivity, in the first 2 years after
the takeover. As the observed employment reduc-
tions do not correspond to performance improve-
ments, these results suggest that post-merger work-
force reductions initiated by AHFs have a negative
impact on long-term human capital investments
(Strine, 2016).
Overall, our findings indicate that AHFs have
an adverse impact on takeovers. This contrasts
with the majority of findings from US studies,
which show at least positive outcomes in the first
year or two after the transaction. One explanation
might be that UKAHFs target potential acquirers
who are worse performers than other firmsmount-
ing takeovers, and that this path dependency is
carried over into post-takeover performance.
However, there is no evidence to support this:
pre-takeover ROA and ROS differ little between
acquirers with and without AHF. Another might
relate to the nature of the AHF involvement. In
the US studies, attention has focused on AHF
interventions to enhance governance and man-
agement, thereby forcing managers to improve
performance. Involvement in takeovers – the
topic of our research – is more uncertain. Many
takeovers fail to improve performance due to lack
of synergy (Renneboog and Vansteenkiste, 2019),
and AHFs are ill-suited to guiding managers to
achieve successful outcomes.
A novelty of our study compared with previ-
ous studies, nearly all of which have been carried
out in the governance environment of the USA, is
that we focus on AHF ownership, both its magni-
tude and presence, rather than on observable ac-
tivism. This represents something of a gamble in
that we are not able to observe how AHF own-
ers influence companymanagers.Nevertheless, our
results show that our approach is reasonable as,
even though there are only a small number of
cases of AHF ownership in our sample, AHF
presence is clearly associated with employment
changes post-takeover. There is much less evidence
of an AHF effect on performance, and it may well
be that more public interventions are necessary
to bring about longer-term performance improve-
ments. However, the fact that US studies of inter-
ventions have also often found that performance
improvements are short-term lends credence to our
approach.
A broader contribution of our study is that it
implies that actors adapt to the governance sys-
tem they find themselves in, thereby reinforcing the
importance of institutional norms and contexts.
Thus, although AHF types cut across national
boundaries, with particular investment strategies
being common in the USA, Europe and beyond,
the means of executing these strategies can vary
across national contexts. Thus, systemnormsmod-
ify actor behaviour (Jacoby, 2007). If AHFs (and
other investors) ignore important norms in their
country of operation, they may well be ineffective
in their strategies, as found by Buchanan, Chai and
Deakin (2020). In our case, AHFs operate ‘quietly’
rather than ‘loudly’ (as is the norm in the USA).
This reflects the importance of discretion and pri-
vacy in the British corporate governance system.
The study has some clear implications for man-
agers of companiesmounting takeovers: it is better
not to have AHFs on the ownership register, either
in the lead-up to the transaction or in the imme-
diate aftermath! Of course, managers of listed
companies cannot usually choose their investors
and AHF ownership stakes are often unwelcome.
However, managers can influence to some degree
the types of investors that are attracted to their
companies: in some cases in our sample, company
managers had clearly invited AHF involvement
and in at least one case the company had put itself
at the disposal of the AHF as a takeover vehicle
and to facilitate industry restructuring. The impli-
cation is that managers wanting to avoid AHF in-
volvement should frame their takeover intentions
in a way that emphasizes synergies and market
growth rather than restructuring and rationaliza-
tion. Where AHFs are involved in takeovers, man-
agers may need to resist pressures from AHFs for
restructuring, especially if managerial judgement
suggests that AHFs’ objectives could have adverse
impacts. They might draw on the support of other
longer-term shareholders to assist them in this.
A possible limitation of our study is that we
do not report findings on the role of AHFs in
target firms. The literature has found that AHFs
sometimes pressure targets to be taken over, so
that the AHFs benefit from the takeover premium.
Equally, AHFs may obstruct takeovers to secure
the higher premia typically arising from contested
takeovers. In the early stages of our research, we
investigated the role of AHFs in the targets, but
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the results were non-significant. Hence, we have
not reported these results. Ideally, we would have
wanted more cases of AHF involvement, but im-
portantly the small number of cases is neverthe-
less associatedwith significant outcomes.A further
limitation is that we do not observe the character
of the pressure that theAHFs put onmanagement.
It may well be that company managers are influ-
enced by the mere presence of AHFs rather than
active pressure from AHFs. Unfortunately, we are
unable to determine precisely how far this is the
case. There is evidence in our sample that firms
are willing conduits for AHF acquisition strate-
gies. This is an inevitable limitation when evalu-
ating the influence of actors in the UK corporate
governance system, since governance processes are
conducted behind closed doors much of the time.
Further research of a qualitative nature is needed
to deepen our understanding of how AHFs affect
post-takeover employment changes and company
performance.
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